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The water resource literature documents the solution that community water system 
regionalization (CWSR) offers, based on economies of scale, to challenges small community 
water systems (CWSs) face born of financial distress. But in practice very few systems actually 
regionalize.  Imposing a model based on economies of scale, this paper estimates stakeholder 
implications to consumers and water purveyors that could materialize if CWSR takes place. The 
analysis applies social welfare theory then, drawing upon the literature and with empirical 
analysis, estimates consumer surplus and CWS rents to ascertain consumer and purveyor effects.  
The paper applies the framework to four New Mexico communities and reports results based on 
expected outcomes within these areas. Results indicate that the magnitude of consumer effects 
(generally positive) and purveyor effects (also, generally positive) depend on the pricing scheme 
imposed post regionalization.  The results will inform those interested practitioners in CWSR.     
Keywords: social welfare theory, water demand, regionalization, local water management  
JEL Codes: Q25, H70, R11   
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Community Water System Regionalization and Stakeholder Implications:  
Estimating Effects to Consumers and Purveyors  
Introduction 
Small community water systems (CWSs) face the challenge to distribute large fixed costs 
across, by definition, a small rate base.  At the same time small CWSs primarily operate in areas 
where economic conditions limit customers’ ability-to-pay. Economic reflection on these two 
realities calls to mind the financial solvency of small CWSs.  Distributing large fixed costs over 
a small rate base, where ability-to-pay such costs or the political will to collect them may be 
insufficient, means that pricing does not recover costs and system performance dwindles.  These 
realities have led policy makers and researchers to investigate the role for community water 
system regionalization (CWSR) to mitigate water system problems that stem from large fixed 
costs, small rate bases and financial insolvency.     
The United States has approximately 53 thousand community water systems, many of 
which are small CWSs, that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates under 
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (R. C. Raucher et al., 2007; US EPA, 1974).1  EPA 
categorizes water systems into five categories based on number of customers served.  Very large 
CWSs serve 50 thousand people or more, large systems serve 10 to 50 thousand, medium 
systems serve 3,300 to 10 thousand, small ones serve 500 to 3,300 and very small systems serve 
500 people or less.  Of the total CWSs that EPA regulates, nearly 90 percent are small to very 
small and nearly 30 thousand systems serve 500 people or less (R. C. Raucher et al., 2007; Shih, 
Harrington, Pizer, & Gillingham, 2006).  Challenges that small CWSs face, therefore, extend 
across the United States.      
                                                
1 A CWS provides service to at least 25 people or to 15 water connections. 
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Financial solvency challenges, and funding shortfalls, lead to failing and inadequate 
infrastructure.  Poor and inadequate infrastructure jeopardizes system reliability and disrupts 
systems’ goal of to provide safe and reliable drinking water (R. C. Raucher et al., 2007).  Lee 
and Braden (2008) estimated that in the United States, and for very small to medium sized 
systems, CWSs need to invest 75 to 103 billion dollars within the next 20 years to maintain 
infrastructure reliability.  Moreover the water resource literature explains how CWSR offers as a 
solution, based on economies of scale, to small CWS challenges (R. C. Raucher et al., 2007; Shih 
et al., 2006; Ottem, Jones, & Raucher, 2003; Graham, 1999; National Research Council, 1997).  
And yet in practice very few systems actually regionalize.  Some argue that, among others 
factors, autonomy loss plays a leading role (National Research Council, 1997).  This paper 
considers cost savings and efficiency gains but focuses beyond these to evaluate benefits to all 
stakeholders, including customers, from CWSR.  Could it be the case that ratepayers are worse 
off under CWSR?  Understanding consumer benefits will help CWS managers make better, more 
informed decisions when considering CWSR.       
The literature that studies CWSR divides into two branches (R. C. Raucher et al., 2007). 
The large branch focuses on connection costs and physical limitations. The EPA found, for 
example, that as many as 50 percent of small CWS could reduce costs through CWSR (US EPA, 
1993). Others found that for small-to-large mergers, system savings materialize approximately 
35 percent of the time but that for small-to-small mergers the estimate range reduces to 10 to 20 
percent (Castillo, Rubin, Keefe, & Raucher, 1997).  Further, the urban and rural distinction in 
CWSs influences the size of expected savings due to availability of resources to fund the merge 
and due to system size (Ottem et al., 2003; Rubin, 2003).  The smaller branch considers 
successful cases of regionalization. Graham (1999) explores key aspects of success in CWSR 
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cases and finds that among several, considering customer benefits is not generally considered but 
is essential.  Lee and Braden (2008) evaluated cases of CWSR in six states, finding that in some 
cases CWSs regionalized to achieve regulatory compliance with the SDWA.   
Few studies estimate customer benefits from CWSR.  Most studies focus on the impact to 
technical, managerial and financial capacity (TMF), which is essentially the capacity to generate 
increased revenue. Still others have recognized the gap in the water resource literature pertaining 
to stakeholder benefits (R. C. Raucher et al., 2007; R. C. Raucher, Harrod, & Hagenstad, 2004).  
Reese, Palmer, and Nelligan-Doran (2000) estimated benefits from CWSR in terms of source 
reliability improvement but not benefits to stakeholders directly.  This paper begins to fill this 
void in the literature.  It estimates benefits that customers could realize from CWSR in four New 
Mexico communities.  It begins with background on CWSs and CWSR, and barriers that have 
prevented its implementation.  Then the paper presents the theoretical framework to measure 
stakeholder effects followed by the empirical section that operationalizes the theory model.  The 
results section shows anticipated outcomes when the model applies to four New Mexico 
communities.  The results indicate that CWSR generates positive effects to consumers and 
purveyors but the magnitude of such impacts depends on the pricing structure imposed post 
regionalization.  Lastly the paper summarizes and concludes.   
Background and Discussion 
The literature documents the potential cost savings from, and impediments to CWSR.  
Shih et al. (2006) found that nationwide, cost savings could reach 417 million to 794 million 
dollars from CWSR.  But others found that loss of local control, self-governance and autonomy 
impede CWSR (National Research Council, 1997; Clark & Stevie, 1981a).  Further, resistance to 
CWSR remains the norm despite the fact that CWSR would provide small CWSs’ ability to 
ESTIMATING CWSR EFFECTS 
 
6 
achieve greater regulatory compliance with the SDWA, improve financial solvency and thus lead 
to greater system reliability.  CWSR improves the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivered 
product by lowering production costs and increasing delivery reliability (R. C. Raucher et al., 
2007, 2004).  With documented potential for better CWS performance and yet limited 
implementation of CWSR, one might question why do we not see more of it.  Could it be that 
CWSR negatively effects customers and thus be the source of resistance?  The literature 
recognizes that CWSR will in fact not become widespread until “communities feel it is in their 
best interests” to implement such a policy (National Research Council, 2002).  This underscores 
the relevance of this paper.  By estimating CWSR effects to customers, it quantifies how 
customers ‘might feel’ about CWSR.  This will allow policy makers to make more informed 
decisions regarding CWSR.  
This section presents the intuition of CWSR, economies of scale. Then it reviews what 
CWSR means and the definition the paper use for the remainder of the exposition.     
CWSs and Economies of Scale  
 The primary goal of a CWS is to provide safe and reliable water service at least cost (R. 
C. Raucher et al., 2007).  Fixed costs, especially, characterize the motivation for CWSR. 
Building water infrastructure consumes many resources and leads to high cost.  Infrastructure 
treats and delivers water with sufficient quality and reliability to satisfy customer demand.  
Given these roles that infrastructure plays, planners build it to create capacity that corresponds to 
pre-determined levels of customer demand and water quality.  And both of these assumptions 
turn out to be important pieces of CWS management. 
 INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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 Figure 1 shows three average cost curves for a representative CWS where average cost 
results form the division of total costs by total water delivered.  Point a shows the minimum 
average cost for the curve labeled AC1.  Given a level of customers who demand Q1, point a 
shows the production level that achieves the least per unit cost and P1 is the price that recovers 
costs.  The capacity and infrastructure associated with AC1 are based on customer demand Q1, 
and a fixed level of water quality which the figure does not represent.  If demand increases to Q2 
and distribution capacity remains constant, per unit cost increases to point b and recovering costs 
requires the price P2.  If capacity is built based Q1 but demand turns out to be less than Q1, then 
costs fall as demand increases to Q1 because of economies of scale.  Per unit costs fall as 
production increases up to the point at which demand equals the level for which distribution or 
quality capacity was designed.   
 On the other hand if demand increases to Q2 but capacity remains consistent with cost 
structure AC1, diseconomies of scale means that unit cost increase to point b.  But what if the 
CWS could somehow re-design its capacity to be consistent with a cost structure represented by 
curve AC2?  Then, due to economies of scale, unit cost decreases to point c and the price P3 
recovers costs.  Carrying on the long run assumption of flexible capacity to meet demand, the 
dotted line represents the minimums of the average cost curves that would result. The long run 
average cost curve, LAC, shows that economies of scale exist for levels of demand less than Q3 
but that diseconomies exist for levels greater.  This is the motivation for CWSR.  CWSR will 
change a CWS’s existing cost structure.  CWSs can expand their capacity, take advantage of 
economies of scale, and thus distribute costs over a larger customer base through CWSR.  
Community Water System Regionalization (CWSR) 
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 Regional solutions to water management challenges include various alternatives, of 
which CWSR is one.  Solutions divide into two types: structural and non-structural, and can be 
thought of as those that lead to CWS connections that are either physical or organizational (R. C. 
Raucher et al., 2004).  In the vernacular of water resource management, non-structural solutions 
include mutual aid across CWSs, sharing agreements and contract services.  Structural solutions 
include water purchase agreements, collaborative water resource development and consolidation 
(R. C. Raucher et al., 2007).2  Consolidation leads to the greatest improvements in water supply 
reliability and quality compliance (R. C. Raucher et al., 2007).  CWS consolidation occurs when 
two or more systems merge, to include tying together infrastructure from both systems, and form 
a new entity.  In this paper, CWSR strictly means consolidation. 
 The feasibility for a community to adopt CWSR depends on the geographic location of 
CWSs therein.  For example CWSR is not feasible for a CWS where the closest CWS neighbor 
is geographically far away.  Previous research found that economies of scale exhaust as distance 
between merging partners increases (Castillo et al., 1997; Clark & Stevie, 1981a, 1981b).  
Therefore the paper models CWSR in communities where more than one CWS exists.  If CWSR 
is geographically feasible the next issue becomes financial feasibility.  The 1996 amendment to 
the SDWA made the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund available to water providers.  Its 
purpose is for providers to upgrade system reliability, to include consolidation (Lee & Braden, 
2008).  Since the goal of this work is to estimate consumer and purveyor effects, the paper makes 
the assumption that geographic feasibility implies financial feasibility by way of loanable funds. 
To that end, the paper focuses on stakeholder effects on the margin and not connection costs. 
                                                
2 See Raucher et al. (2004) for in-depth discussion alternative regional solutions.   
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 Water quality violations and service disruptions, which plague small CWSs, are effects of 
revenue shortfalls.  Spreading treatment costs and supply acquisition costs over a small rate base 
means that systems operate with insufficient revenues and capacity, and thus challenges emerge.  
CWSR rectifies part of these challenges by expanding the rate base over which treatment and 
acquisition costs are spread.  This improves CWSs’ technical, managerial, and financial capacity 
(TMF).  The paper makes the assumption that greater TMF results from greater net revenue.  The 
SDWA calls for water systems to develop and or improve TMF because more TMF implies less 
water quality violations (R. C. Raucher et al., 2007; US EPA, 1993).  The EPA has supported 
systems to build such capacity by investing millions of dollars (Jaffe, Braden, & Min-Yang, 
2007), but CWSR is another way CWSs can build TMF and in turn provide high quality, reliable 
water service.  Moreover, CWSR means better water resource management because management 
moves to the hydrologic basin level as opposed to the CWS level.  Better resource management 
means less supply disruptions (R. C. Raucher et al., 2007).  TMF, greater regulatory compliance, 
and improved system reliability put CWSs on a path to sustainability (R. C. Raucher et al., 2004; 
National Research Council, 1997).  And CWSR promotes each of these.   
Theoretical Framework  
The paper considers how regionalization could affect water customers and water 
purveyors in a community that implements CWSR.  It assumes purveyors provide water solely to 
customers whose water use is for domestic purposes.  The impact magnitude that each group 
realizes depends, among other things but primarily on, the pre and post CWSR per unit water 
price.  A market model of a CWS provides a framework to estimate effects to customers in terms 
of consumers’ surplus (CS) and to purveyors in terms profit or rent (R).  Figure 2 depicts the 
theoretical model on which the analysis relies.  For both groups, the analysis measures effects at 
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the level of the CWS then sums them to the community level.  Comparing static outcomes at the 
level of the community before and after CWSR estimates effects to customers and purveyors.  
The mathematical model that follows considers an unspecified CWS, indexed with i, then will 
sum impacts across m CWSs within the community to ascertain community-wide effects.   
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Within System Effects 
CS measures the benefit to customers, denominated in dollars, from being able to 
consume water.3  Figure 2 illustrates CS as the lightly shaded area labeled Consumer Surplus.  
Measuring CS requires a water demand function. Aggregate water demand for Qi  units of water 
within CWS i: 
 Qi = D Pi ,Yi ,Ni ,Xi( ) , (1) 
                                                
3 CS is the difference between consumers’ maximum willingness-to-pay for each unit of the good 
and the price where at the good is actually consumed (Layard & Walters, 1978).  Marshallian 
consumers’ surplus has long been used as a technique for evaluating welfare effects in utility 
regulation. See, e.g., Dimopoulos (1981) and Mitchell (1978).  The approach has not been met 
without some criticism.  For example Boardway (1974) notes that when evaluating a 
heterogeneous population complete welfare effects are not captured.  However this critique can 
be overcome under two theoretical considerations. Willig (1979) points out that when income 
effects are relatively small, consumers’ surplus acts as good measure of societal impact.  
Secondly, a theoretical condition for preferences (the demand function) can be constructed such 
that consumers’ surplus acts as a good index of welfare change (Renzetti, 1992; Blackorby & 
Donaldson, 1985).  
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is a function of the per-unit water price,  Pi , income,  Yi , the number of connections served, Ni , 
and a vector of socio-demographic characteristics,  Xi in the community.  Using equation (1), the 
analysis measures CS as: 
 
 
CSi = D Pi ,Yi , Ni ,Xi( )
Pi
P
! dp , (2) 
where P is the choke price on the water demand curve.  It is the price where customers demand 
no water, effectively “choking off” water demand.  
The model measures purveyor effects with rents the system earns.  Rents are the 
difference in the per unit price and average cost at a given level of production. Figure 2 
illustrates these as the darker shaded area labeled Rents.  The paper considers the CWS cost 
structure in the long run, to estimate R, when all costs are variable and incorporated into the 
production of  Qi .  Following Shih et al. (2006), the average cost is: 
  , (3) 
where is a vector of CWS specific characteristic such as water source and ownership type.  
Thus, rents to the ith purveyor are given by: 
 Ri = Pi ! ACi( )Qi . (4) 
Within Community Effects 
 The paper estimates CWSR effects at the level of the community for two primary 
reasons. CWSR is feasible within communities where more than one CWS exists. Customers and 
managers within a particular CWS may be either welcoming or reluctant to the idea of CWSR, 
depending on system characteristics wherein they are located and characteristics of potential 
CWSR partners.  For example, a CWS that enjoys high system reliability could be hesitant to the 
 
ACi = f Qi ,Zi( )
 Zi
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idea of merging with a CWS that experiences frequent service disruptions.  Similarly, hesitation 
could be born out of variations in water treatment quality or per-unit price across potential 
CWSR partners.  Therefore, CWSR will likely produce “winners and losers” so the paper 
estimates impacts at the community level to see if losses can be offset by gains.  Secondly, in 
earlier work on CWSR Clark and Stevie (1981a, 1981b) found that the largest cost savings will 
be for partner CWSs that are less than approximately nine miles apart.  For these two reasons, 
variation in user impacts across CWSs and the Clark and Stevie distance restriction, the paper 
estimates effects at the community level.     
 Let m CWSs exist in community k, and assume that all CWSs within the community are 









!Ri . (6) 
 The superscript 0 denotes measurement prior to CWSR.  Equations (5) and (6) measure how 
well off customers and purveyors are prior to adopting CWSR.   
 To find community effects, equations (5) and (6) need to be applied before and after 
CWSR so that the change can be identified.  Recall from equations (2) and (4) the roll that Pi  
and ACi  play in CS and R.  When CWSR occurs, the question becomes what Pk and ACk will 
prevail after the merge?  The answer to this question influences the extent of effects to both 
customers and purveyors.  The paper now identifies its assumption for three pricing possibilities 
and average cost that it employs to estimate effects.   
Prices and Costs  
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The paper calls the pricing alternatives it considers status quo pricing (sq), cost-recovery 
pricing (cr), and cost-plus pricing (cp).  Under status quo pricing customers experience no 
change in the per-unit water price. The before-and-after CWSR price remains the same such that 
Pksq = Pi .  This alternative means that prior customers of CWSi  may face a different price than 
prior customers of CWSj where j ! i  and yet receive water service from the same new system, 
CWSk , where CWSk  results from the merger of CWSi  and CWSj . This pricing alternative 
appears because of the potentiality that customers’ primary resistance to CWSR may be due to 
fear of changing prices.   
Cost-recovery is most similar to water management in practice today.  This alternative 
sets Pkcr = ACk  for all customers in the new system.  A priori, one would anticipate this 
alternative to generate the largest gain in CS.  Passing all cost savings from CWSR through to 
customers is sure to make them better off, in the near term.  In the long term customers may not 
be better off but this question is beyond this paper’s intent.     
Cost-plus pricing directly allows for rent generation in CWSR.  Status quo pricing may 
allow for rents, depending on what ACk  turns out to be, but cost-plus pricing directly allows for 
rents since Pkcp > ACk .  But what will the cost-plus mark up price be?  The paper defines this 
alternative with a cost-price relationship, !i , for each CWSi  in community k according to the 
Lerner Index as: 
 !i
"
= Pi # ACiPi
, (7) 
where ! is the price elasticity of water demand (Viscusi, Vernon, & Harrington, 2005).  Then it 
applies the largest markup in community k, ! j , where ! j >!i " j # i  in: 
ESTIMATING CWSR EFFECTS 
 
14 








 The socially optimal cost-plus mark up to apply would include the scarcity value of water or 
opportunity cost of foregone water use(Hansen, 2011), but that is beyond the scope of this 
analysis and is not included here.   
 Average cost in CWSk  depends on the characteristics of the systems that engage in 
CWSR.  Similar to equation (3), average cost in CWSk is given by: 
 ACk = Qk ,Zk( ) , (9) 
where Qk = Qi
i
m
! .  The vector Zk  indicates the system characteristics that pertain to the new 
system after CWSR. 
 Net Effects 
 The paper identifies net effects within a community by comparing CS and R before and 
after the community chooses to implement CWSR.  The customer and purveyor impacts after 




!CSi Pkl ,Yi ,Ni ,Xi( )  (10) 
and 
 Rk1 = Pkl ! ACk( )Qk ,  (11) 
where the superscript l on the price variable indexes the pricing alternatives sq, cr, and cp.  Thus, 
to see the net impact of CWSR within community k and under three pricing alternatives, find the 
differences in equations (5) and (10) then in (6) and (11) as in: 
 !CSk = CSk1 "CSk0  (12) 




 !Rk = Rk1 " Rk0.  (13) 
Equations (12) and (13) are those that the analysis uses in the next section to estimate 
community impacts in four New Mexico communities.  The paper now turns to the numerical 
methods that it uses to operationalize (12) and (13).   
Empirical Framework  
Water Demand 
 Estimating CS requires a water demand function.  This analysis uses data that the New 
Mexico Public Regulation Commission (NMPRC) provided, and it estimates a water demand 
curve.  The section that follows describes the data and then discusses the empirical estimates of 
water demand that the paper produces.   
 The NMPRC currently regulates 36 privately run, investor-owned CWSs in New 
Mexico.4  To ensure that CWSs offer fair and reasonable water rates to consumers, the NMPRC 
collects annual revenue and consumption data from each system.  The NMPRC makes these data 
available to researchers upon request.  This analysis uses data that reflects 33 CWSs under 
NMPRC regulation, which is the number NMPRC regulated at the time of the request.  The data 
span 13 years from 1992 to 2005.  However, the panel data is not balanced since data for each 
CWS is not available in every year of the time frame.  By CWSs, the NMPRC data show the 
annual number of customers, the total gallons sold, and gross revenues.  From these data, the 
analysis generates price and quantity variables.  Table 1 shows the data’s descriptive statistics.   
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
                                                
4 See, e.g., www.nmprc.state.nm.us/regent.htm for all utilities that NMPRC regulates.  Last 
accessed 24 August 2011.   
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The price variable is the quotient, or average revenue, that results from the division of 
gross revenues by total gallon sales.  The study uses average price since earlier findings suggest 
that consumers react more to average than marginal prices (Nieswiadomy, 1992).  Quantity 
derives from total gallon sales reported in the data.  The connection variable reports the total 
number of connections that each CWS serves and is not disaggregated into user types.  Assume 
that each connection represents 2.6 people, which is the average household size the U.S. Census 
Bureau reports for NM, to convert connections to people served.5  The conversion implies that 
the average CWS that NMPRC regulates fits into the small EPA system size category.  Further, 
the data show that approximately 45 percent of the observations come from very small systems, 
33 percent are from small systems, 15 percent from medium and six percent from large systems.  
The table presents variables for income and age to proxy for the socio-demographic 
characteristics of each community served by a CWS.  These data come from the U.S. Census in 
the year 2000.  The analysis converts monetary variables to constant, 1995 dollars using the 
Consumer Price Index provided from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.6            
The analysis uses the data described in Table 1, and STATA 11, to estimate equation (1).  
It begins by estimating a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model where quantity is the 
dependent variable, in gallons, and price is per gallon. The data are cross sectional and a 
Breusch-Pagan test finds that heteroscedasticity is a problem.  To correct for it, the analysis re-
estimates the model with a log-log specification but heteroscedasticity remains.  The OLS model 
in Table 2 shows the log-log model, it uses heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.   
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                
5 See, e.g., http://factfinder.census.gov/.  Last accessed 25 August 2011.   
6 Consumer Price Index (CPI) available at www.bls.gov/cpi/ last accessed 25 August 2011.   
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The data originate from 33 CWSs over 13 years so the next step is to test for CWS 
specific effects.  The FE model in the table presents the fixed effects estimation results. This 
model estimates that 77 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is due to CWS-level 
effects.  Then the analysis uses a Hausman test to evaluate the correct model specification for 
CWS-level effects, fixed or random.  The RE results in the table show the model for random 
effects.  The Hausman test indicates that the RE specification is correct.  Following the FE and 
RE models, however, further analysis finds that heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation remain.7  
The table presents the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) model that corrects for panel-level 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  Within each panel, it uses heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors and an AR1 process.  A further Hausman test finds that the GLS model is a better 
estimator than the RE model and thus the GLS model is the one the following analysis uses.      
The log-log estimation in the GLS model means that the coefficients are elasticities.  The 
price elasticity (-0.538) shows that water demand in the representative CWS is price-inelastic.  It 
shows that, over the relevant range of prices, customers within the representative system are 
somewhat unresponsive to changes in price.  A ten percent increase in price would lead to a 5.4 
percent reduction in water demand.  This is consistent with the median elasticity that Espy, Espy 
and Shaw (1997) report (-0.51) and with those summarized in Brookshire, Burness, Chermak and 
Krause (2002). The connection elasticity means that a 10 percent increase in connections leads to 
an equivalent increase in demand.  The positive income elasticity shows that water is a normal 
good.  As people’s income rises, so too does their demand for water.  The age elasticity, 
consistent with Krause, Chermak and Brookshire (2003), shows that older people use less water.  
                                                
7 The test in STATA for heteroscedasticity after a fixed effect model uses a Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier test (Baum, 2006a).  After a random effects model the test is a modified 
Wald-test (Baum, 2006b).  The test in STATA for autocorrelation in panel data uses the 
Wooldridge-test (Drukker, 2003).     
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A ten percent increase in the median age of people in the community leads to a reduction in 
water demand of almost 12 percent.                     
Average Cost Function       
 The stylized model in Figure 2 illustrates, and equations (3) and (9) demonstrate, that to 
estimate CS and R requires an empirical average cost function.  Data that empirical analysis 
entails to produce such estimation are proprietary and difficult to readily obtain at the CWS 
level.  But Shih et al. (2006) estimated CWS economies of scale using survey data that the EPA 
collects every five years.  Table 3 presents the model that Shih et al. estimated.  It is the model 
this analysis uses to operationalize equations (3) and (9).     
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 The EPA conducts the Community Water System Survey where it randomly identifies 
which CWSs in the U.S. it requires to report pertinent data for use in setting regulation policy.  
Shih et al. use data from the 1995 and 2000 surveys, and follow a simplified method based on 
one set out in Christensen and Green (1976), to estimate economies of scale for CWSs.  Their 
paper estimates several models, but the one this paper uses (Table 3) has 565 observations from 
the 1995 survey.  The approach they follow assumes that decision makers within CWSs operate 
the system at the point of technical efficiency.  That is to say that water system production is on 
the production possibilities frontier so that no further output can be produced for a given level of 
inputs (Shih et al., 2006).   
 The dependent variable for the model Table 3 presents is the natural log of annual unit 
cost where unit cost is in 1995 dollars per one thousand gallons.  Annual production of finished 
water, W, is in million gallons.  The next three variables are dummy variables to control for 
system specific characteristics such as surface water or groundwater, purchased water, and public 
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or private ownership.  The Shih et al. paper nets out any taxes that private CWSs pay so that the 
ownership comparison is in like terms.  Their model shows that for an increase in production of 
finished water of 10 percent unit cost falls by 1.6 percent (log-log specification means the 
interpretation is as an elasticity).  Surface water systems’ costs are 17 percent greater than 
systems that use groundwater.  Systems that purchase water have unit costs 52 percent greater 
than those that do not purchase water.  And, public systems’ unit cost is 12 percent less than 
privately owned systems.   
Empirical Equations for CS and R 
 In order to estimate impacts from CWSR, the analysis requires numerical specification of 
theory.  The GLS model in Table 2 provides necessary information to specify equation (1) thus: 
 Qi = c1Pi!0.54  (14) 
where c1 = e8.05Ni1.03Yi0.42Ai!1.16 and Ni is connections, Yi is income and Ai is age.  The Shih et al. 
cost model in Table 3 provides the parameters necessary to specify equation (3): 









where c2 = e8.34+0.17SUR+0.52PUR!0.12PUB .  Using these two equations, the analysis estimates CS and R 
before and after CWSR.   
 To find the numerical specification for CS, take equation (14) and integrate it over 
changes in price to find: 
  CSi = 2.17c1Pi
0.46∣PiPi  (16) 
where Pi  is the per unit water price within CWSi  prior to CWSR.  Recall that the paper imposes 
three possible price alternatives after CWSR.  To find CS after CWSR, the analysis substitutes 
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Plk  in for Pi .  Earlier the paper mentioned that P is the choke price, or maximum price 
consumers are theoretically willing to pay to consume the last unit of water.  With a linear 
demand curve the choke price is finite however with the exponentially estimated form used here 
the number is infinite, and that is not theoretically consistent.  To correct this the analysis 
computes a price for each CWS consistent with 13.2 gallons (50 liters), a recognized amount 
necessary for basic human existence, drinking, food preparation and sanitation (Gleick, 1998).  
This means that Pi represents the maximum price consumers in CWSi  would be willing to pay 
for water beyond this basic subsistence level, and the it means consumption meets basic needs.   
 The numerical specification for R derives from substituting equation (15) into equation 
(4) to find:   











Qi .   (17) 
Equation (17) shows the specification to estimate R before CWSR.  To find it after CWSR, 
analogous to the after method to find CS, substitute Plk  in for Pi .  Further, substitute Qk  in for 
Qi  where Qk = Qi
i
m
! .   
 Equations (16) and (17) are those that the next section uses to estimate consumer and 
purveyor impacts from CWSR. 
Estimating CWSR Impacts in four New Mexico Communities 
Drought in the summer of 2002 created stress on New Mexico (NM) CWSs that over ten 
percent of systems where not able to bear, and 70 CWSs shutdown.  These systems lacked 
capacity and ability to collaborate with other systems and hence continue to provide water 
service.  State government leaders investigated the crisis and found that “(a) chronic lack of 
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planning, resulting in community water systems that were not robust enough to handle the stress 
of drought conditions” (NM State Engineer’s Office, 2005).  To solve the problem, leaders 
initiated the Area-Wide Collaborative Water Planning Project to increase collaboration between 
neighboring CWSs (Cervantes, 2005).   
The project’s goals were to increase collaboration to manage water resources, promote 
collaboration among stakeholders for infrastructure planning, and improve efficiency of CWS 
operation.  The project planned for goals to be carried out with a series of nine steps that parallel 
non-structural and structural collaboration discussed earlier in the paper.  In the project, 
collaboration increased with steps to the point of full consolidation.  A few NM CWSs agreed to 
planning-documents, but consolidation remains unobserved.  CWS managers are reluctant to 
participate due to autonomy loss and increased government involvement (Holmes, 2006), a 
situation found in earlier research (National Research Council, 1997; Clark & Stevie, 1981a).            
This section estimates what NM policy makers could expect if CWS managers in four 
communities were to adopt CWSR.  In these communities small CWSs exist alongside larger 
systems.  By hypothetically imposing CWSR, the paper evaluates how CWSR could affect 
consumers and purveyors.  Table 4 shows the communities (Hurley, Questa, Ruidoso and Los 
Lunas) and the CWSs within each community.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 These communities provide representative examples of issues that influence CWSR 
outcomes, and they reflect the nature of outcomes to expect if NM policy makers adopt CWSR.  
The town of Hurley, for example, provides a case where the two CWSs are under different types 
of ownership and supply water from different types of sources.  Further, the two CWSs are both 
in the very small EPA category where a merger would move the new system into the small 
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category.  Questa shows the case where a very small system merges with a small system and the 
new system remains in the small category.  It further shows two CWSs that have different 
pricing structures.  Cerro East charges a flat rate water price while Questa Water charges a per 
unit price.  Ruidoso and Los Lunas each provide cases where very small and small systems 
merge with systems of medium size.  Further, these two communities offer a case where three 
CWSs would be partners to the merge.     
 This paper’s author compiled the data for Table 4 from three sources.  The New Mexico 
Environment Department Construction Program Bureau surveys New Mexico CWSs and it 
reports findings in the Municipal Water and Wastewater User Charge Survey.  The NMPRC 
collects data, as noted earlier, that provides information on individual CWSs.  Finally, staff in the 
New Mexico Office of the State Engineer filled in missing information that was not available in 
the two previously listed sources.  The prices that Table 4 shows are in constant 1995 dollars to 
maintain consistency with the empirical framework discussed in the previous section. 
 Using the prices that Table 4 displays, and the cost model from equation (15), the 
analysis finds that seven of ten systems earn positive rents.  Both Hurley systems and the Cerro 
East system from Questa earn negative rents, or in other words operate at a financial loss.  For 
the Hurley systems, the loss results since the unit cost is greater than the unit price.  The 
estimated unit cost for the Hurley Water Supply System and North Hurley System is 3.3 and 4.3 
dollars per one thousand gallons, respectively.  The negative rent issue for Hurley systems poses 
a problem for the cost-plus pricing alternative since neither system charges a price mark-up.  To 
correct for this in the results that follow, with respect to Hurley rents only, the cost-plus pricing 
results are identical to the cost recovery results since cost recovery is a price increase.             
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For the Cerro East System, the loss is due to flat rate pricing. Flat rate pricing prevents 
the analysis from determining water consumption using the demand curve in equation (14).  In 
order to overcome this impediment the paper assumes that daily per capita consumption in this 
system is 500 gallons, which translates the unit price to 0.10 dollars per one thousand gallons, 
essentially a consumption level where price is not a determining factor.  Under this assumption, 
the unit cost for water in the Cerro East System is 2.4 dollars per thousand gallons. 
The paper now turns to Table 5, where it presents the results of CWSR estimated effects 
to consumers and purveyors in each community. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 The results imply that the extent consumers experience effects depends on the pricing 
alternative.  For example, under the status quo alternative customers realize no immediate effect.  
This is due to the fact that prices do not change under the status quo.  Yet this makes possible a 
situation where one group of customers within the newly merged system face higher (lower) 
prices than other customers within the same system.  Customers realize the largest, positive 
effect under the cost recovery alternative.  This results since all of the efficiency gains from 
CWSR pass directly to consumers.  Cost plus pricing shows that customers will experience 
benefits, albeit less than under cost recovery. 
 Analogous to consumer effects, purveyor effects depend on which pricing alternative 
follows CWSR.  When status quo prices follow the results show that purveyor impacts vary.  
Recall that the Hurley systems both operated at a loss prior to CWSR.  The status quo results 
show that Hurley would experience a 118 percent increase in rents.  But in Ruidoso and Los 
Lunas rent modestly increases.  The cost recovery alternative shows that Hurley would see a rent 
increase but the other communities would see rent decreases.  This is because gains from CWSR 
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pass directly to consumers leaving systems that were previously collecting rent now without it.  
The cost plus alternative shows significant potential for rent to increase in each community.     
 Table 5 shows that CWSR effects, in addition to variation with the post merger price, 
vary with system size.  The purveyor effects show that when the merger results in a medium 
sized system the potential for increased R, and thus TMF (technical, managerial, and financial 
capacity), is greater than when the merger results in a small system.  Hurley’s potential for 
increased R, where the new system is a small one, is 118 percent while for Ruidoso and Los 
Lunas, where the new system is of medium size, the potential exceeds 200 percent.  Questa’s R 
potential, where the new system is small, is 458 percent but this spurious result is due to one of 
the merging systems’ flat rate pricing prior to CWSR.  These findings are consistent with 
Castillo et al. (1997) who found that cost savings materialized more often with small-to-larger 
mergers than small-to-small mergers.  Further, the findings imply that the direction of customer 
impacts might be reverse of purveyor impacts.  The largest gain in CS results in Hurley and 
Questa (24 and 20 percent, respectively) while smaller gains result in Ruidoso and Los Lunas (12 
and 19 percent, respectively).   
Perhaps herein lies at least a part of the reason why CWSR is not more pervasive in water 
utility management.  Cases with the potential for the greatest improvement in TMF might also be 
those where the potential for positive customer effect may be the least, and thus the source of 
CWSR resistance.  Examining customer effects by system sheds further light on how consumer 
impacts vary from mergers.             
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 Table 6 shows how customer effects vary within the community.  For example consider 
the hypothetically new CWS in Hurley that serves two groups of customers; one group from the 
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former Hurley Water Supply System (HWSS) and one group from the former NHMDWCA.  
Customers from the former HWSS experience virtually no effect under either pricing alternative 
yet NHMDWCA customers realize a positive benefit.  The monthly effect to customers of the 
latter group is 8 to 45 dollars of CS, depending on pricing alternatives.  Further, even greater 
variation exists for customers of the new Questa CWS.  CWSR negatively impacts former 
customers of CEMDWCA, -21 to -28 CS dollars per month, while it positively impacts former 
customers of QWS, 4 to 45 CS dollars per month.  These two communities highlight the 
variation in customer effects that CWSR likely will produce.  To a lesser extent, variation exists 
in customer impacts for Ruidoso and Los Lunas.  Former customers of AVSD and HMEWC, 
both very small systems, realize roughly half the benefits that former customers of larger systems 
in Ruidoso and Los Lunas realize.  One exception, however, is for the former customers of 
MWC where cost plus pricing negatively impacts them. 
 The results above show that CWSR, with respect to consumers, makes some groups 
strongly better off, some groups moderately better off and some groups worse off.  Water policy 
makers who hold authority to implement CWSR should find this information engaging.  To be 
sure, efficiency gains have been found in previous work (Raucher et al., 2007; Shih et al., 2006; 
US EPA, 1993) and the research here finds the same result.  However, these results supply new 
information for policy makers when considering CWSR.  First, CWSR primarily leads to 
positive customer effects.  Some customer groups are more positively effected than others but for 
the most part customers are better off.  Second, the distribution of customer effects is uneven.  
These two findings imply potential reasons why CWSR is not more widespread.  A likely reason 
stems from customers’ lack of knowledge on how much better off they would be under CWSR.  
Or, perhaps customers are concerned about the uneven distribution of effects.  In either case, this 
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means that for CWSR to be successful policy makers need to inform customers how CWSR will 
affect them, positive or negative, and for how long.         
 CWSR produces some unintended consequences too, like increased water demand.  
Under status quo pricing, the analysis predicts no change in water demand since prices remain 
unchanged.  For cost recovery pricing water demand increases 2.7 times in Hurley, three times in 
Questa, five times in Los Lunas, and by roughly ten percent in Ruidoso.  For the case of cost plus 
pricing water demand increases by 2.7 times in Hurley, 2.1 in Questa, 2.4 in Los Lunas, and by 
five percent in Ruidoso.  This unintended consequence suggests that when policy makers 
consider how to implement CWSR, they need to also consider prices to reflect water scarcity. 
Summary, Extensions and Conclusions  
 Researchers have found that community water system regionalization (CWSR) offers 
community water systems (CWSs) a solution to financial solvency challenges.  By taking 
advantage of economies of scale CWSs can distribute fixed costs across a larger rate base, reduce 
unit costs and thereby reduce the per unit price needed to recover operating costs.  But despite 
findings to create cost savings, CWSR is not widely practiced.  Perhaps this is because of how 
little is known regarding how CWSR impacts stakeholders.  This paper relies on social welfare 
theory (consumer surplus and rents) and empirical analysis to estimate how CWSR might affect 
two groups of stakeholders, water consumers and water purveyors.  It applies the model in four 
New Mexico communities.  By hypothetically imposing CWSR in these communities ten CWSs 
become four CWSs, one system per community.  Doing so lets the paper estimate effects that 
policy makers should think about when considering plans to implement CWSR. 
 The paper finds that in the NM communities (Hurley, Questa, Ruidoso and Los Lunas) 
CWSR generally makes a positive impact to consumers and purveyors, but the magnitude of the 
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effects depends on water prices before and after the merge.  Customers who pay flat rate prices 
prior to CWSR loose some consumer surplus by merging into a new system where the pricing 
scheme is per unit.  Customers who come from CWSs that prior to CWSR operated at a loss will 
also loose some consumer surplus.  But the majority of customers in these communities will gain 
consumer surplus.  Further, water purveyors who prior to CWSR operated at a financial loss will 
at least break even and at most generate greater revenue.  Yet the effects to customers and 
purveyors that this paper finds depend on the pricing scheme chosen after CWSR.   
The paper carried out the analysis in a static framework.  Extending the framework to 
dynamic analysis would let this line of research investigate the extent of population and income 
growth on CWSR effects.  Further, dynamic analysis would facilitate incorporating connection 
costs into the analysis and thus determine the time frame required for CWSR to be cost-effective.      
The paper hypothetically implemented three pricing alternatives that it called status quo, 
cost-recover and cost-plus pricing.  Status quo pricing held prices constant before and after 
CWSR.  Consumers did not loose consumer surplus but purveyors gained rent.  Cost-recovery, 
sometimes referred to as full-cost pricing, passed all the savings generated by CWSR to 
consumers.  Consequently customers gained a lot of consumer surplus but purveyors did not gain 
any additional rent.  Cost-plus pricing computed the largest cost-price mark up of CWSs within 
the community and maintained the same mark up level after CWSR.  This alternative found that 
consumers did gain surplus but that purveyors also improved their rent position.  The results of 
these three pricing alternatives lead to a primary conclusion with respect to CWSR.  Water prices 
matter.  And they matter a lot.   
 A dearth exists in the water resource literature regarding customer benefits that might 
result from CWSR.  But a similar dearth exists regarding what water prices will prevail after 
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CWSR.  This paper begins to fill the gap regarding customer benefits.  The extent of stakeholder 
benefits heavily depends on prices.  This finding suggests that water policy makers who consider 
CWSR should carefully evaluate the prices that will prevail after CWSR.  Prices can be designed 
so that they do not negatively affect customers and still generate rent, which is to say technical, 
managerial and financial (TMF) capacity, for purveyors.  The cost-recovery finding is perhaps 
most striking.  If full-cost pricing follows CWSR and all costs, to include water scarcity costs, 
are not included, then CWSR creates two adverse consequences.  It lowers prices to the point 
that demand increases and the financial position for CWSs does not improve.  CWSR holds the 
potential to solve CWS challenges, and customers can be made better off because of it, but the 
appropriate administration of prices is paramount.                            
  




Baum, C. F. (2006a). An introduction to modern econometrics using Stata. Stata Corp. 
Baum, C. F. (2006b). Stata tip 38: Testing for groupwise heteroskedasticity. Stata Journal, 6(4), 
590–592. 
Blackorby, C., & Donaldson, D. (1985). Consumers’ surpluses and consistent cost-benefit tests. 
Social Choice and Welfare, 1(4), 251–262. 
Boardway, R. W. (1974). The welfare foundations of cost-benefit analysis. The Economic 
Journal, 84(336), 926–939. 
Brookshire, D. S., Burness, H. S., Chermak, J. M., & Krause, K. (2002). Western urban water 
demand. Nat. Resources J., 42, 873. 
Castillo, E. T., Rubin, S., Keefe, S. K., & Raucher, R. C. (1997). Restructuring small systems. 
Journal-American Water Works Association, 89(1), 65–74. 
Cervantes, J. (2005). Develop Water System Planning Criteria. NM HJM 86. 
Christensen, L. R., & Greene, W. H. (1976). Economies of scale in US electric power generation. 
The Journal of Political Economy, 655–676. 
Clark, R. M., & Stevie, R. G. (1981a). A Regional Water Supply Cost Model. Growth and 
Change, 12(3), 9-16. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2257.1981.tb00677.x 
Clark, R. M., & Stevie, R. G. (1981b). A water supply cost model incorporating spatial variables. 
Land Economics, 18–32. 
Dimopoulos, D. (1981). Pricing schemes for regulated enterprises and their welfare implications 
in the case of electricity. The Bell Journal of Economics, 185–200. 
Drukker, D. M. (2003). Testing for serial correlation in linear panel-data models. Stata Journal, 
3(2), 168–177. 
ESTIMATING CWSR EFFECTS 
 
30 
Espey, M., Espey, J., & Shaw, W. D. (1997). Price elasticity of residential demand for water: A 
meta-analysis. Water Resources Research, 33(6), 1369–1374. 
Gleick, P. H. (1998). The human right to water. Water Policy, 1(5), 487–503. 
Graham, A. G. (1999). Managing Constraints to Water Source Development. American Water 
Works Association. 
Hansen, J. K. (2011). On the Economics of Optimal Urban Groundwater Management in the 
Desert Southwest. 
Holmes, M. (2006). Regionalization of Rural Water Systems in New Mexico, September-
October. 
Jaffe, M., Braden, J., & Min-Yang. (2007). Working Together: Factors leading to water system 
mergers, 7(Spring). 
Krause, K., Chermak, J. M., & Brookshire, D. S. (2003). The demand for water: Consumer 
response to scarcity. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 23(2), 167–191. 
Layard, P. R. G., & Walters, A. A. (1978). Microeconomics theory. 1978. McGraw-Hill, New 
York. 
Lee, M.-Y. A. L., & Braden, J. B. (2008). Examining mergers in small CWSs: The role of 
regulatory compliance. Journal of American Water Works Association, 100(11), 58-67. 
Mitchell, B. M. (1978). Optimal pricing of local telephone service. The American Economic 
Review, 68(4), 517–537. 
National Research Council. (1997). Safe water from every tap: improving water service to small 
communities. National Academies Press. 
National Research Council. (2002). Privatization of water services in the United States: an 
assessment of issues and experience. National Academies Press. 
ESTIMATING CWSR EFFECTS 
 
31 
Nieswiadomy, M. L. (1992). Estimating urban residential water demand: effects of price 
structure, conservation, and education. Water Resources Research, 28(3), 609–615. 
NM State Engineer’s Office. (2005, November 3). Criteria for Water System Planning, 
Performance, and Conservation as a Condition for State Funding. 
Ottem, T., Jones, R., & Raucher, R. C. (2003). Consolidation Potential for Small Water 
Systems–Differences Between Urban and Rural Systems. National Rural Water Assn., 
Duncan, Okla. 
Raucher, R. C., Cromwell, J., Henderson, J., Wagner, C., Rubin, S., Goldstein, J., Huber-Lee, A., 
et al. (2007). Regional Solutions to Water Supply Provision. American Water Works 
Research Foundation. 
Raucher, R. C., Harrod, M., & Hagenstad, M. (2004). Consolidation for Small Water Systems: 
What are the Pros and Cons. National Rural Water Association-White Paper. 
Reese, A. G., Palmer, R. N., & Nelligan-Doran, S. E. (2000). Potential Benefits of Water Supply 
Regionalization: A Case Study the Seattle and Everett Water Systems. Building 
Partnerships. 
Renzetti, S. (1992). Evaluating the welfare effects of reforming municipal water prices. Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management, 22(2), 147–163. 
Rubin, S. (2003). Criteria to Assess the Affordability of Water Service. Critical Issues in Setting 
Regulatory Standards (2nd ed.). National Rural Water Association, Duncan, Okla. 
Shih, J. S., Harrington, W., Pizer, W. A., & Gillingham, K. (2006). Economies of scale in 
community water systems. Journal American Water Works Association, 98(9), 100–108. 
US EPA. (1974). Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Retrieved July 9, 2011, from 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/rulesregs/sdwa/index.cfm 
ESTIMATING CWSR EFFECTS 
 
32 
US EPA. (1993). Technical and economic capacity of states and public water systems to 
implement drinking water regulations: report to Congress. The Agency. 
Viscusi, W. K., Vernon, J. M., & Harrington, J. E. (2005). Economics of Regulation and 
Antitrust (fourth edition.). The MIT Press. 
Willig, R. D. (1979). Consumer’s surplus without apology: Reply. The American Economic 









Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Quantity overall 154,176.8 335,471.6 515 1,573,818.0 372 
(thousand  between  302,178.4 1,143.7 1,4386,874.0 33 
 gallons) within  75,133.4 -318,550.5 724,962.5 11.3 
       
Price* overall 3.51 1.73 0.94 10.77 372 
(per  between  1.60 1.40 6.80 33 
thousand  within  0.73 1.19 7.49 11.3 
gallons)       
       
Connections overall 1,230.6 2,773.9 7.0 14,646.0 373 
 between  2,459.9 10.1 12,647.6 33 
 within  772.4 -3,100.5 8,258.6 11.3 
       
Income* overall 28,511.40 6,329.59 20,025.00 45,269.85 373 
 between  6,047.74 20,025.00 45,269.85 33 
 within  0 28,511.40 28,511.40 11.3 
       
Age overall 34.5 4.6 28.6 47.0 373 
 between  4.6 28.6 47.0 33 
 within  0 34.5 34.5 11.3 








Models of CWS water demand by estimation type 
Variable OLS FE RE GLS 
Constant 6.12* 9.23* 6.64* 8.05* 
 (0.672) (0.384) (1.660) (0.710) 
ln Price -0.656* -0.489* -0.554* -0.538* 
 (0.033) (0.050) (0.042) (0.026) 
ln Connections 1.02* 0.908* 1* 1.03* 
 (0.007) (0.037) (0.018) (0.006) 
ln Income 0.415* omitted 0.487* 0.417* 
 (0.064)  (0.187) (0.070) 
ln Age -0.776* omitted -0.937* -1.16* 
 (0.115)  (0.309) (0.111) 
Observations 372 372 372 369 
Adjusted R2 0.984 0.615   
Wald !2     3,501 37,046 
RMSE 0.236 0.169 0.171  
ln natural log operator 





Scale economies of total operating expense  
Variable Number (Standard Error) 
Constant 8.34*    (0.061) 
ln W † -0.16* (0.009) 
Surface 0.17*  (0.050) 
Purchased 0.52*  (0.053) 
Public -0.12* (0.041) 
Adjusted R2 0.46 
Observations 565 
* Significant to 1% level  
† Log change in production  
Reproduced from Table 3 in Shih et al., (2006) 
  




Four New Mexico communities to estimate CWSR effects 
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CWSR effects to consumers and purveyors by community 
 Pricing Alternative 
Community Status Quo Cost Recovery Cost Plus 
  Consumer impacts 
 ∆ CS % ∆ CS % ∆ CS % 
Hurley - - 69 24 12 4 
Questa - - 408 20 28 1 
Ruidoso - - 4,797 12 455 1 
Los Lunas - - 3,963 19 337 2 
  Purveyor impacts 
 ∆ R % ∆ R % ∆ R % 
Hurley 24 118 20 100 20 100 
Questa 8 21 -36 -100 167 458 
Ruidoso 37 3 -1,248 -100 2,542 203 
Los Lunas 78 7 -1,062 -100 2,317 218 
 
∆ CS and ∆ R in thousands of dollars 















CWSR consumer effects by system and under two pricing alternatives:   
∆ CS in dollars per connection per year  
Community CWS Cost Recovery Cost Plus 
Hurley 
Hurley Water Supply System 7 7 
North Hurley MDWCA 538 90 
Questa 
Cerro East MDWCA -256 -341 
Questa Water System 542 51 
Ruidoso 
Alpine Village Sanitation District 206 47 
Rancho Ruidoso Rainmaker 535 67 
Village of Ruidoso 575 54 
Los Lunas 
Hi Mesa Estates Water Corp 377 83 
Los Lunas 937 92 
Monterey Water Co 732 -59 
 
  




Figure 1.  Average Cost Curves 
Figure 2.  Stylized CWSi  Market Model 
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